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ELECTRONIC VS. OPEN OUTCRY: SIDE-BY-SIDE TRADING OF KCBT 
WHEAT FUTURES1 
Abstract 
This study compares liquidity costs of electronic and open outcry hard red winter wheat 
futures contracts traded side-by-side on the Kansas City Board of Trade. Liquidity costs 
are considerably lower in the electronic market than in the open outcry market. A new 
approach is used to estimate liquidity costs, which eliminates bias due to splitting of 
orders in electronic markets. The liquidity costs in the electronic market are still 
considerably lower after eliminating the bias. Liquidity costs were higher in after-hours 
trading as compared to regular trading hours suggesting a negative impact of volume on 
liquidity costs. Volatility of futures prices and volume per trade r  positively related to 
liquidity costs, while a negative relation is found between daily volume and liquidity 
costs. Price clustering at whole cent prices is found in the open- utcry market which 
helps explain its higher liquidity costs. Daily volumes were distinctively higher during 
the rolling period as a result of Goldman-Sachs Roll, but not enough to explain the higher  
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 This essay also appears as Shah, S., and B.W. Brorsen. 2011. “Electronic vs. Open Outcry: Side-by-Side 
Trading of KCBT Wheat Futures.” Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics. 36(1):48-62. Copyright 
held by Western Agricultural Economics Association. Included with permission. 
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liquidity costs in the open outcry market. Trade size is larger in the open outcry market 
which suggests large traders prefer open-outcry trading. 
Introduction 
Futures and options exchanges worldwide are shifting from conventional open outcry 
markets to electronic trading. Reasons for this shift include reduced transactio  costs, less 
trading errors, and increased speed of execution. Many agricultural markets now offer side-
by-side trading of both open outcry and electronic markets. Users need information about 
whether to execute orders in the open outcry or the electronic market. Users are likely to
prefer the market with lower liquidity costs. A liquidity cost is the cost incurred by buyers 
and sellers when using a market order to liquidate their positions quickly. For exampl ,  
person who desires to immediately sell a contract receives the prevailing bid price while 
someone wanting to sell immediately would receive the ask price. The difference in price 
received by an urgent seller and the price paid by an urgent buyer is the liquidity cost.  
 Previous research has studied the effects of the migration from open outcry to 
electronic trading on relative efficiency, execution costs, and informational efficiency and 
mostly favors electronic markets. Examples include Ates and Wang (2005), Aitken, Frino, 
Hill, and Jarnecic (2004), Tse and Zabotina (2001), Blennerhasset and Bowman (1998), 
Frino, McInish, and Toner (1998), Martens (1998) and Pirrong (1996). This past research has 
largely considered financial futures markets rather than agricultural commodity futures 
markets. Because some aspects of the microstructure of financial futures markets are 
different from those of commodity futures markets, it is important to investigate f findings 
about financial futures markets are applicable to agricultural commodity futures markets. For 
instance, commodity futures markets tend to have much lower trading volumes that are more 
3 
concentrated among a few large hedgers than in financial futures markets, and have a 
relatively higher proportion of informed traders2 (Foster and Viswanathan, 1994). Thus, the 
automation of trading may have a different impact on liquidity costs in a commodity futures 
market than in a financial futures market.  
Two studies investigated the transition to electronic trading in commodity futures 
markets. First, Bryant and Haigh (2004) evaluated the impact on liquidity cos s of moving 
from open outcry to electronic trading only– a before and after comparison in two LIFFE 
commodity futures markets. In contradiction with the findings of previous research in 
financial futures markets, they found that liquidity costs increased after the LIFFE market 
moved to electronic trading. Second, Frank and Garcia (2009, 2011) measured the impact of 
adding an electronic market alternative on liquidity costs in lean hogs and live cattle futures 
markets. They find that increased electronic trading reduced liquidity costs. There is no 
consensus about the impact of electronic trading on liquidity costs in commodity futures 
markets, which motivates further investigation of the issue. The question of whether or not 
the findings of financial futures markets are applicable to commodity futures markets 
remains unanswered. None of the studies of commodity markets compared liquidity costs in 
electronic versus open outcry markets with side-by-side trading.  
 This study compares liquidity costs in side-by-side trading of electroni and open 
outcry wheat futures contracts traded at Kansas City Board of Trade (KCBT). The KCBT 
introduced electronic trading on the CME Globex® platform on January 14, 2008. At KCBT, 
electronic and open-outcry markets co-exist. Intraday transaction prices are used to estimate 
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 An informed trader possesses information not reflected in the current market price and thus can profit by 
trading based on that information. 
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liquidity costs since KCBT does not provide bid-ask quotes for the open outcry wheat futures 
market and only irregularly provides them for the electronic market. Average absolute price 
deviation and Roll’s (1984) measure that is based on the autocovariance of prices are used as 
measures of liquidity cost. A new approach is used to estimate liquidity cost in the electronic 
market that eliminates bias due to splitting3 of orders in the electronic market. The study 
identifies the impact of different factors such as daily volume, volume per trade, and price 
volatility on liquidity costs. To explain the difference in liquidity costs in the electronic and 
open outcry markets, we also examine the degree of price clustering in the two markets. The 
potential impact of the Goldman-Sachs roll on the KCBT wheat open outcry market is 
examined to see if it is likely to explain much of the difference in liquidity costs in the two 
markets.  
Expected Differences in the Two Markets 
A key difference in electronic and open-outcry trading is the different order execution rules. 
At KCBT, open-outcry trading occurs on a trading floor where members (traders) trade 
continuously through open outcry. Traders publicly announce bid and ask prices. If a trader 
finds a bid or ask attractive, the trader simply sells at the bid or buys at the ask price. The 
transaction price is then made public. Quotes are valid only for a short time. A trader can also 
request a quote, and then may accept the best price or refuse to trade. When there are
multiple traders with the same offer or ask, the buyer or seller can choose with whom to 
trade.  
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 In the electronic market, a large market order is often offset by multiple limit orders (sometimes at different 
prices). These are reported as multiple transactions and thus the single market order ends up being split. In 
the open outcry market, a large market order is typically offset by a floor trader taking the other side at a 
single price. 
5 
Electronic trading is a continuous auction system with automatic order matching in 
which traders communicate only via computer screens without revealing their names. The 
automatic auction mechanism matches market orders with existing limit orders. For multiple 
identical best bids or asks, the trade is assigned to the order that has been in the system the 
longest Unlike the open outcry system, a bid or ask quote is valid until it is explicitly 
withdrawn from the system. Large market orders will often be offset with multiple limit 
orders that are selected according to price and the time the quote entered the system. The 
electronic system will report the single market order as multiple trades if it i offset by more 
than one limit order. 
The electronic market’s splitting of market orders due to order matching may cre te 
downward bias in estimates of liquidity costs. No previous study of liquidity costsin 
electronic markets has attempted to account for this bias. To eliminate this bias, probable 
splits in the dataset are identified and aggregated to represent one order and then estimates of 
liquidity costs are calculated. 
One obvious difference between the two trading systems is the limit order book4. In 
electronic trading, traders have access to an anonymous limit order book, while in open-
outcry trading, no official limit order book exists. However, identities and the be avior of 
other traders can be observed on the floor. Some researchers have argued that this anonymity 
of market participants in an electronic market increases adverse selection, wh ch causes 
higher bid-ask spreads (Glosten, 1994; Bryant and Haigh, 2004). Another important 
difference between the two trading systems is order execution. In electronic trading, a large 
order can be matched with several orders from the limit order book at different prices. Also, 
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 The limit order book is the record of all unexecuted limit orders.  
6 
an electronic market may not have enough orders in the limit order book to offset a large 
order without a large price impact. Therefore, large trades may have lower liquidity costs in 
open-outcry markets than in electronic markets.  
Prior to the opening of side-by-side trading at the KCBT, Borchardt (2006, p. 13) 
offered this explanation of why large traders would prefer open outcry:  
 Personally, I truly believe that the liquidity will still rest in the trading pits during 
open outcry, but what you may see is that some of the small orders, that are more of a 
nuisance to the pit than they are a help, may bleed over to the electronic system to be 
executed. … But, the liquidity will still reside in the pit. When I first came to the 
exchange back in 1982, you’d go down to the floor, and if someone was trading 10 or 
20 contracts, that was a pretty good size. And 50 contracts was huge! Now everybody 
in the pit will trade 50, and most of them will trade 100, and there is a core group of 
people down there who will trade 300 to 500 contracts at a time. They’re the true 
liquidity providers, the depth that’s needed for the big commercials and for the 
financial monies that are flowing into the exchange. 
Price clustering offers alternative hypotheses about the expected differences in 
liquidity costs in the two markets. Price clustering is when transactions occur more at some 
prices than at other prices. Several past studies across different market structures and 
financial instruments have observed price clustering at round numbers (Klumpp, Brorsen, 
and Anderson). Market participants tend to use round number prices more frequently than 
fractions, which results in concentration of transaction prices around round numbers. Sev al 
hypotheses have been proposed to explain the clustering of prices: the negotiation 
hypothesis, the collusion hypothesis, the attraction hypothesis and the economic-cost 
hypothesis. According to the negotiation hypothesis (Harris 1991), traders use a limit d 
number of price points to simplify and reduce the cost of negotiation. When fewer price 
points are used, negotiations converge rapidly, which avoids frivolous offers and 
counteroffers. The attraction hypothesis (Ascioglu, Comerton-Forde, and McI ish 2007) 
7 
suggests clustering is due to psychological preferences for some price points. Gwilym, Clare 
and Thomas (1998) found a positive relationship between price clustering and bid-ask 
spreads in LIFFE bond futures and argued that their results generally favored the attraction 
hypothesis. The collusion hypothesis (Christie and Schultz 1994) argues that clustering i  
caused by implicit collusion of traders. Christie and Schultz found intense clustering in 
NASDAQ stocks and observed that even though the minimum price fluctuation at NASDAQ 
was 1/8 cents, in more than 70 per cent of actively traded stocks the odd eighth quotes were 
virtually non-existent. They concluded that NASDAQ dealers implicitly co luded to maintain 
wide spreads. After the results of Christie and Schultz were reported, NASDAQ dealers 
sharply increased their use of odd-eighth quotes and effective spreads fell almost 50 per cent. 
The economic cost hypothesis (Kleidon and Willig 1995; Grossman et al. 1997), however, 
suggests that scalpers have a greater tendency to choose rounded quotations when the 
economic costs of scalping are high. In particular, when price volatility is high, price 
clustering allows participants to transact quickly in order to reduce risk (Gwilym, Clare, and 
Thomas 1998).  
Price clustering is more likely in the open outcry market than in the electronic market. 
The negotiation and collusion hypotheses can only explain price clustering in the open outcry 
market since the electronic market is anonymous. In open outcry markets, the trades,
especially large orders, can be implicitly negotiated on the trading pit by the floor traders. 
The negotiation hypothesis suggests that such a process might lead to a less fineprice grid 
such as whole cents or half cents. Further, by the economic-cost hypothesis, due to more 
8 
frequent transactions, scalpers5 in the electronic market can more easily ascertain the value of 
their holdings, which would result in less price clustering towards round numbers. The 
converse can be argued for open-outcry trading. Hence, price clustering, and therefore higher 
liquidity costs, is expected to be greater in the open outcry market than in the electronic 
market.  
The three factors expected to affect liquidity costs in both trading systems are daily 
volume, volatility, and volume per trade. Previous research about liquidity costs in fu ures 
markets finds that liquidity costs decrease as trading volume increases and liquidity costs 
increase as price variability increases (Thompson and Waller 1988; Brorsen 1989; 
Thompson, Eales, and Seibold 1993; Bryant and Haigh 2004; Frank and Garcia 2009). The 
volume effect implies that the supply of liquidity services is downward6 sloping (Brorsen 
1989). Scalpers benefit from economies of size and these benefits are passed on in the f rm 
of lower liquidity costs. The higher volume in the 2008 KCBT electronic market (KCBT 
2008) is one reason why liquidity costs in electronic markets are expected to be lower than 
those of open-outcry markets. Conversely, in a volatile market, holding inventory is risky o 
traders increase the bid-ask spread to compensate for the increased risk. Hence, volatility is 
expected to have a positive relation with liquidity cost. The third factor believed to affect 
liquidity costs is volume per trade. In the electronic market, high volume orders may not be 
filled at a single price. However, in the open outcry market, a scalper may have a higher bid-
ask spread for the largest orders.  
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 Scalpers are extremely short-term traders who profit by selling at a price slightly above the last transaction 
and buying at a price slightly below the last transaction. Scalpers are the main liquidity providers in futures 
markets. 
6
 This downward sloping supply of liquidity services causes futures exchanges to be natural monopolies. This 
likely explains why competing futures exchanges do not offer identical contracts. 
9 
Data 
The intraday prices used are the tick data for hard red winter wheat futures contracts traded at 
the Kansas City Board of Trade (KCBT 2008). At KCBT, wheat futures contracts are traded 
with five expiration months: March, May, July, September, and December. The database 
contains a record of each trade price of the five contracts traded in both open outcry and 
electronic markets in 2008. This year had unusually high and volatile prices. While we are 
not aware of any obvious reason why this volatility would affect electronic and ope-outcry 
markets differently, the results need to be viewed with consideration that the year studied is 
atypical. The KCBT does not record bid and ask price for open-outcry wheat futures mark ts 
but, for its electronic wheat futures market, it provides occasional time stamped bid and/or 
ask prices. However, there are too few concurrent observed bid and ask prices to produce 
accurate estimates of liquidity cost. Hence, observed bid-ask spreads are not included. 
Regular trading hours for open outcry trading at KCBT are 9:30 a.m. to 1:15 p.m. Monday 
through Friday. The electronic market operates during regular trading hours and 6:00 p.m. to 
6:00 a.m. Sunday through Friday. One trading day for electronic trading is from 6:00 p.m. 
through 1:15 p.m. of the next day. Daily volumes in number of contracts for each contract in 
both markets are also from KCBT (2008).  
Procedures 
The bid-ask spread is an accepted measure7 of liquidity cost in security and futures 
markets. If bid and ask prices are recorded, prevailing spread in any m rket could be directly 
estimated. However, bid and ask prices are usually not recorded for open-outcry futures 
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 The preferred measure is the effective spread. The effective spread is the absolute value of the trade price 
minus the midpoint of the most recently quoted bid and ask prices. The liquidity cost on a round turn, which is 
what we calculate, is then two times the effective spread. 
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markets, which creates a need for indirect measurement of bid-ask spreads. Various 
estimators have been developed that estimate bid-ask spreads using commonly available 
transaction data. Spread estimators developed in the literature have mostly used either the 
covariance of successive price changes or have employed averages of absolute price changes. 
The former include Roll’s measure developed by Roll (1984) and extensions of Roll’s 
measure such as that proposed by Chu, Ding, and Pyun (1996), which relaxes the assumption 
of equal probability of trade direction in Roll’s measure. Holden (2007) developed a model 
that uses both serial correlation like Roll’s measure and price clustering to estimate the 
effective spread. The latter type of estimators which employ absolute price changes include 
average absolute price deviation proposed by Thompson and Waller (1987) and a different 
average absolute price deviation measure used by Commodity Futures Trade Commission 
(CFTC). The CFTC measure only includes non-zero price deviations and price changes that 
are in the opposite direction of the previous change. Smith and Whaley (1994) suggest a 
method to estimate effective bid-ask spread from transaction data in futures markets that uses 
first and second moments of absolute price change distribution. Frank and G rcia (2011) 
used a modified Bayesian approach proposed by Hasbrouck (2004) to estimate b d- sk 
spread in commodity futures markets and discussed its performance compared to other 
estimators. For a comprehensive discussion of performance of various spread estimators, 
readers are directed to Locke and Venkatesh (1997), Bryant and Haigh (2004) and Goyenko, 
Holden, and Trzcinka (2009). 
We are interested in relative behavior of spreads in the two markets ather than 
individual performance of spread estimators. Considering the objectives of the study and 
quality of data available, the present study uses only Roll’s measure and average absolute 
11 
price deviation as estimators of bid-ask spread. Moreover, use of th se wo measures enables 
comparison of the results of this study with previous studies of Thompson, Eales, and 
Seibold (1993) and Shah, Brorsen, and Anderson (2009) which used the same measures to 
estimate liquidity costs in the KCBT wheat futures market.  
According to Roll (1984), if markets are informationally efficient, the covariance 
between price changes is negative and directly related to the bid-ask spread. Roll’s measure 
(RM) is: 
(1)   2cov
∆, ∆, 
where ∆ is the change in price at time t. Roll’s measure is more precise with more frequent 
observations since most price movements will then be due to bouncing between bid and ask 
prices rather than changes in equilibrium prices. Thompson and Waller (1987) suggest the 
average absolute value of price changes as a measure of average execution costs. Average 
absolute price changes are calculated as  
(2)  Average absolute price change  ! ∑ |∆F%|!%& . 
The liquidity costs for the five contracts are estimated in both electronic and open 
outcry futures markets using Roll’s measure and average absolute deviations. Each measure 
is calculated for each day and then averaged for the life of the contract weigh ed by daily 
number of trades. 
In electronic markets, if the market order is larger than the first-in-line limit order, the 
large order is split into smaller orders and matched with two or more limit orders sometimes 
at different prices. This practice results in underestimating liquidity costs when using the 
12 
above measures. When an order is split, the electronic market data record the transaction as 
multiple observations even though it is only one market order. To overcome this bias, all 
probable splits in the dataset are identified. In electronic markets, matched trad s are time 
stamped with the precision of seconds. We assume that the trades at the same second can 
only be recorded if they are split. The probability of two orders arriving in the same second is 
small with the number of trades in the KCBT wheat futures market. All the trades occurring 
at the same time (same second) are averaged and treated as a single observation. Then 
average absolute price deviations are calculated from the reduced dataset and referred to as 
aggregate average absolute price deviations.  
To test hypotheses about factors influencing liquidity costs, the following regression 
equation is estimated using restricted maximum likelihood: 
(3) ()  *+ , *-.) , */0.) , *1.) , 2 , 3), 
where () is liquidity cost of maturity month m on day 4, -.) is volume (number of 
contracts) per trade, 0.) is volume, . is price volatility measured as the difference between 
highest price and lowest price (range), 2 is random effect of trading day. The error terms 2 
and 3) are assumed independently distributed normal with mean 0 and variances 56/  and57/. 
Apart from the fixed effects explained by the first three independent variables in the above 
model, 2 explains any random effect of day on liquidity cost. If the estimate of 56/  is zero, 
the model is equivalent to ordinary least squares. In previous literature, several measures of 
volatility such as range, variance, and standard deviation of prices were used to determine the 
impact of volatility on liquidity cost. Variance and standard deviation of intraday prices, 
however, would measure almost the same thing as our dependent variable. Hence, daily 
13 
range of prices is used as a measure of volatility in the present study. The daily price range is 
included to measure the uncertainty about the underlying asset value. Since the dependent 
variable must be positive, the residuals are not truly normal as assumed, but statistical tests 
are asymptotically valid as long as residuals are asymptotically normal. Separate regressions 
are estimated for open-outcry, the electronic market, and the electronic market with 
aggregate trades. Pooling of data from the open outcry and electronic markets was rejected 
using a Chow test (F-statistic: 37.75)8.  
Results 
Total volume traded in wheat electronic futures markets during 2008 at KCBT was 
1,882,302 contracts compared to 1,033,741 contracts in open outcry markets (KCBT 2008). 
Number of trades and volumes by contract month are in Table 1. Average trades per day in 
the electronic markets are larger than for open-outcry markets. However, average volumes 
per trade for electronic markets are considerably lower than that of open-outcry markets. The 
small trade size in the electronic market might be partly due to splitting of large orders with 
electronic trading. Also, as argued by Martens (1998), traders may trade differ ntly in 
electronic markets and they could choose to enter several small orders rath th n a single 
large order when trading in the electronic market.  
Monthly volumes for electronic and open outcry markets are shown in figure 1. The 
daily volume of the July 2008 contract for electronic and open-outcry contracts is preented 
in Figure 2. The results for the July contract are representative of all five contract months and 
only the results with the July contract data are presented.  Daily volumes of July electronic 
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 When the model was estimated by combining datasets for both markets and using a dummy variable that 
was equal to zero for the electronic market and one for the open outcry market, the dummy variable had a 
significant coefficient of 0.77 indicating higher liquidity costs in the open outcry market.  
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contracts are higher than those of open outcry contracts throughout the life of the contracts 
except for a few occasions.  
 The liquidity costs for the five contracts in both electronic and open outcry futures 
markets are presented in Table 2. The electronic market has substantially lower liquidity cost. 
The average Roll’s measure for electronic markets ranges from 0.26 cents per bushel to 0.78 
cents per bushel while for open outcry it ranges from 1.18 cents per bushel to 2.17 cents per 
bushel. In a study of side-by-side trading in financial futures markets, Pirrong (1998) also 
found lower liquidity costs in the electronic market. Shah, Brorsen and Anderson (2009)
estimated the same measures for the July 2007 open outcry wheat futures contract. They 
report Roll’s measure of 0.45 cents per bushel and average absolute mean deviation of 0.49 
cents per bushel. Thompson, Eales, and Seibold (1993) also estimate the same measuresfor 
selected 1985 KCBT wheat contracts. Their estimates of average absolute devia ions9 are 
0.26-0.29 cents per bushel for highly traded contracts, but are about double these values for 
lightly traded contracts such as the March contract during March or the September contract in 
February. Our estimates of Roll’s measure and average absolute mean deviation for the July 
2008 open outcry contract are 1.18 and 1.23 cents per bushels, respectively. The reasons 
behind higher liquidity costs in 2008, as compared to 2007 for the same contract, are lower 
volumes, high prices, and high volatility in 2008. The total trading volumes for the wheat 
futures markets in 2007 at KCBT were 4,318,007 contracts with only 3,778,266 contracts in 
2008 (KCBT 2008). With the higher prices and higher price volatility in 2008, the risk 
associated with scalping clearly increased, which resulted in higher liquidity costs.  
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 The dataset used by Thompson, Eales, and Seibold (1993) only recorded observations when prices changed. 
When the zero price changes are deleted, our estimates of liquidity costs increase by 42.63 and 46.16 per cent 
in open-outcry and electronic markets, respectively. 
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The average absolute deviations are also considerably lower in electronic markets 
than in open outcry markets. The average absolute price deviations for electronic markets 
range from 0.26 to 0.70 cents per bushel. The frequency of the number of trades occurring at 
the same time in both electronic and open outcry markets is presented in Table 3. The first 
column indicates the number of trades occurring at the same second. The other columns 
indicate the frequency of those occurrences in the electronic and open outcry markets. For 
example, the third row in the table indicates that three trades at the same second wre 
observed 23,075 times in the electronic market while three trades at the same second was 
observed only one time in the open outcry market during 2008. The numbers reveal a much 
higher number of trades occurring at the same second in the electronic market th n in the 
open-outcry market. This result is evidence of the splitting of large orders in the electronic 
market. To mitigate the bias of average absolute price deviation estimates created by splitting 
larger orders in the electronic market, aggregate average absolute price deviations are used 
(Table 2). The estimates of aggregate average absolute price deviation range from 0.33 to 
0.89 cents per bushel, which are higher than the non-aggregate trades, but still lower than 
those for the open outcry market.  
 Figure 3 shows the number of trades by time of day. The open outcry market opens at 
9:30 and closes at 1:15. Notice that most of the trading in the electronic market occurs during 
the open-outcry trading. The possibility of arbitrage opportunities between th  two markets 
should cause the prices to move together closely. Average liquidity costs at different times of 
the day are calculated by segmenting total trading hours in one-hour intervals (Figure 4). The 
figure shows that liquidity costs are larger in the open outcry market at both the open and the 
close. Ekman (1992) argues that informed traders are more likely to trade at the open and 
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close so that is when more price movements occur. The changes in equilibrium prices during 
these time periods could cause liquidity costs to be overestimated near the open and close. 
The electronic market shows greater liquidity costs outside open outcry trading hours, which 
could be explained by the small volume.  
Index funds mimicking the Goldman-Sachs Commodity Index traded substantial long 
positions during 2008. When the funds rolled positions into the next contract month 
(Goldman-Sachs Roll 2009), it could have also caused greater price movement, especially at 
the close. The Goldman-Sachs roll occurs on the fifth through the ninth business day of the 
month prior to the expiration month in the open-outcry market at KCBT. Figure 5 presents 
average daily volume in the month prior to expiration for the five contracts under 
investigation. The roll period appears to have higher trading volume compared to the rest of 
the month, especially the 7th business day. However, no significant difference in liquidity 
costs is found during the roll period. Hence, the Goldman-Sachs roll does not explain the 
higher liquidity costs in the open outcry market10. 
At KCBT, wheat contracts are traded in increments of 2/8, 4/8 or 6/8 of a cent. 
Hence, the ending digits after the decimal point of any price can only be 0, 25, 50 or 75. 
Figure 6 shows the frequency of prices ending in the four possible digits. The figure indicates 
that the clustering of prices to whole numbers is much more prevalent in the open outcry 
market than in the electronic market. In the open outcry market, almost 78 percent of prices 
are whole numbers compared to 35 percent in the electronic market. Chung and Chiang 
                                                          
10
 The average liquidity costs during the Goldman-Sachs roll period is 0.39 cents higher than those during the 
non-roll period however, this difference is not significant (t statistic: 0.69).  
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(2006) also found more price clustering in open-outcry index futures compared to E-mini
index futures.  
To determine the relationship between liquidity cost, volatility, average volume per 
trade, and total daily volume of the contract, the model in equation 3 was estimated using 
restricted maximum likelihood estimation. As a proxy for liquidity costs, both Roll’s measure 
and average absolute price changes were used as dependent variables. The measures
produced similar results. However, the regression with average absolute price chang s d 
more observations and thus larger t-values compared to using Roll’s measure11  the 
dependent variable. Thus, only the results of the regression with average absolute price 
changes as dependent variable for open outcry and electronic markets are present d in Table 
4. The results show a significant negative effect of daily volume on the liquidity cos s for 
both electronic and open outcry markets. The negative effect of volume is consistent w th 
higher volumes reducing the risk of holding contracts, which results in lower liquidity costs. 
A significant positive impact of price volatility on liquidity costs is found in both markets. 
However, the sensitivity of liquidity cost to price volatility is less in electronic than in open-
outcry markets. The effects of total volume and volatility are consistent with findings by 
Thompson and Waller (1987), Thompson, Eales, and Seibold (1993), and Bryant and Haigh 
(2004). The average volume per trade shows a positive significant impact on liquidity costs, 
indicating that traders face more risk in holding a larger number of contracts, which results in 
higher liquidity cost.  
                                                          
11
 With Roll’s measure, numbers of observations were low because on several trading days covariances of 
price changes were positive which resulted in non-real values for Roll’s measure. The positive covariance 
occurred 115 (out of 594) observations for electronic trading and 291 (out of 675) observations for open 
outcry trading. 
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Summary and Conclusion 
This study sought to determine whether liquidity costs were larger in the open outcry futures 
market or the electronic futures market. Intraday prices of five hard red winter wheat futures 
contracts traded on Kansas City Board of Trade during 2008 are used. Roll’s measure and 
average absolute price deviations are used to estimate liquidity costs. The average Roll’s 
measure for electronic markets ranges from 0.26 cents per bushel to 0.78 cents per bushel 
while for open outcry markets it ranges from 1.18 cents per bushel to 2.17 cents per bushel. 
Both measures of liquidity costs are considerably lower in the electronic market than in the 
open outcry futures market. The order matching system in electronic markets splits large 
orders into smaller orders when the corresponding limit order is for a smaller size, which 
creates a downward bias in estimates of liquidity costs. After correcting this bias, liquidity 
costs are still considerably less in the electronic market. Trading volumes are higher in open 
outcry markets during the Goldman-Sachs Roll period, but the Goldman-Sachs Roll cann t 
explain the higher liquidity costs in the open-outcry market. More price clustering is found in 
the open outcry market which helps explain the higher liquidity costs in the open outcry 
market. Higher trading volume in the electronic market is one explanation of its lower 
liquidity costs. The regression results suggest a negative relation between liquidity costs and 
daily volume while volume per trade has a positive impact on liquidity costs in both 
electronic and open-outcry markets.  
The results clearly show that the electronic wheat futures market has lower liquidity costs for 
all but the largest traders at KCBT. The key to continued existence of the open outcry market 
appears to be its ability to handle large orders. One question is: how can exchangs redesign 
electronic markets so that they are more attractive to large traders? A move to entirely 
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electronic markets may require the largest orders to be executed off the exchange or may 
require large traders to take on the role of the scalper and submit a series of smaller orders 
that are executed sequentially rather than all at once. Those submitting small market orders, 
however, such as most agricultural producers should prefer the electronic market due to its 
lower liquidity costs. 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of Wheat Futures Contracts Traded at KCBT in 2008 
Contract 










March 51 132.02 
57.33 
(92.21) 51 1000.31 
23.74 
(66.36) 
May 93 85.08 
45.50 
(78.37) 93 610.55 
14.12 
(42.59) 
July 134 167.01 
23.67 
(13.13) 134 1194.60 
3.67 
(2.37) 
Sep 177 84.60 
27.89 
(36.94) 85 1417.75 
5.24 
(5.79) 
Dec 241 72.04 
33.97 
(21.67) 241 991.13 
3.62 
(3.04) 





Table 2. Measures of Liquidity Costs (cents/bushel) in Wheat Futures Contracts 
Traded at KCBT in 2008 
Contract 








































































Table 3. Frequency of Number of Trades Traded at the Same Time in Wheat Futures 
Contracts at KCBT in 2008 
Number of Trades at the 
Same Time 
Frequency 
Electronic Market Open-Outcry Market 
1 321527 69083 
2 73885 137 
3 23075 1 
4 8915 0 
5 3827 0 
6 1970 0 
7 1019 0 
8 577 0 
9 318 0 
10 191 0 
11 120 0 
12 88 0 
13 49 0 
14 39 0 
15 24 0 
16 15 0 
17 14 0 
18 10 0 
19 5 0 
20 1 0 
21 1 0 
22 1 0 
23 1 0 
Note: The first column indicates number of trades occurring at the same second in the dataset. The other
columns indicate the frequency of those occurrences in lectronic and open outcry market. For example, th  
third row in the table indicates that occurrence of three trades at the same second was observed 23,075 times in 
electronic market while it was observed only one time in open outcry market during 2008. 
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Table 4. Regressions with Average Absolute Price Change as Dependent Variable 
Market 
N 







































Note: values in parentheses are p values. OLS estimation was used to produce R-squared values. 
All parameters remain significant with low p-values if White’s heteroskedasticity-consistent 

































Figure 2. Daily volume of electronic and open-outcry July 2008 wheat futures contracts 





















Figure 3. Number of trades at different time of the day  at KCBT in 2008 
Note: For the open outcry market, the first bar represents 30 minutes of trading and the 





























































Figure 5. Average daily volume in penultimate (next to last) contract months of KCBT 
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LIQUIDITY COSTS IN FUTURES OPTIONS MARKETS 
Abstract 
Liquidity cost is one of several factors that hedgers should consider when choosing between 
hedging with a futures contract and hedging with an option contract. While considerable research 
has estimated liquidity costs of futures trading, there is little comparable research about options 
markets. This study, for the first time, attempts to determine and compare liquidity costs in 
options and futures markets. The study also presents a new measure to estimate liquidity costs in 
options markets based on the Black model. The study uses intraday prices fo  wheat futures and 
options contracts traded on Kansas City Board of Trade during 2008-10. Liquidity costs in 
options markets were estimated using observed bid-ask quotes and the new measure. The average 
liquidity cost in options market was estimated to be 4.30 cents per bushel using observed bid-ask 
spreads and it was 4.33 cents per bushel when the new measure was used. Average liquidity costs 
in the futures market was estimated using eight different measur s developed in the literature. 
The estimates ranged from 1.16 to 1.81 cents per bushel for futures contracts. A positive relation 
was found between liquidity costs and days to expiration of the option. Moneyness of the options 
had negligible effect on liquidity cost of the option. The study concludes that liquidity costs in 
options contracts are considerably higher than liquidity costs in futures contracts.
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Introduction 
The traditional role of commodity futures and options markets is risk management and price 
discovery. Producers, processors, and merchants who handle commodities and commodity 
products use these standardized markets to hedge price risk in underlying cash markets. 
Futures accounts are marked to market daily and in a volatile market margin calls could 
quickly deplete a firm’s working capital, making it difficult for firms to hold positions in 
futures market (USDA 2009). Agricultural producers typically dislike the margin calls 
associated with futures contracts and so they have sometimes been encouraged to consider 
options as an alternative. Agricultural producers can hedge their cash market risk by buying 
options. Though hedging with options requires paying premiums upfront, option buyers are 
not required to maintain a margin account. However, options markets are generally less 
liquid than futures markets. So, one important consideration in choosing between hedging 
with futures and options contracts is the relative transaction costs.  
Transaction cost is one of several aspects that hedgers should consider when choosing 
between hedging with a futures contract and hedging with an option contract. On any 
standardized exchange two elements comprise almost all of the transactio cost – brokerage 
fees and bid-ask spreads. The difference in price paid by an urgent buyer and price received 
by an urgent seller is the liquidity cost. Under competitive conditions the bid-ask spread 
measures the cost of making transactions without delay. A person who desires to 
immediately sell or buy a contract will, on average, suffer a markdown equalto h lf of the 
bid-ask spread. It is necessary to know the size of liquidity costs in both futures and optio s
markets to determine which one to use. Thus, there is a need to answer the question of how 
much are liquidity costs in futures and options markets? 
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The answer to this question is important because knowledge of liquidity costs helps 
hedgers and speculators choose between futures and options markets. All speculators and 
hedgers, who transact through floor brokers, should know the size of liquidity costs to 
compare and evaluate available exchanges. Futures exchanges need to know liquidity costs to 
evaluate new alternatives such as electronic trading. Moreover, knowing liquidity costs can 
help researchers to account for them while simulating hedging strategies or speculative 
trading.  
While there is considerable research that estimates liquidity costs in agricultural 
futures markets (Brorsen 1989; Thompson and Waller 1987; Thompson, Eales and Seibold 
1993; Bryant and Haigh 2004; Frank and Garcia 2011; Shah and Brorsen 2011), there is little 
comparable research about options markets. Baesel, Shows, and Thorp (1983) estimated 
overall cost of liquidity services in listed stock options using trade data of a diversified 
portfolio of an options hedge fund. Their study provides a limited idea about liquidity costs 
as it considers a single portfolio hedge fund, which might have been traded differently than a 
typical options trader. Considering liquidity costs is an important criterion in choosing 
between futures and options markets and so far no research has attempted to estimate and 
compare liquidity costs in both markets simultaneously. The purpose of this article is o 
estimate and compare liquidity costs in options and futures markets. The articl uses different 
measures of effective bid-ask spread in Kansas City Board of Trade (KCBT) wheat futures 
and options markets and also proposes a new alternative measure of liquidity costs in options 
markets. Further, the study estimates the effects of factors expect d to affect size of liquidity 




Measures of Liquidity Costs 
 In open-outcry commodity futures markets, liquidity is primarily provided by floor 
traders who readily bid and offer a price for a specific contract. Since the floor traders must 
make a profit for providing their services the price at which a trade occurs is different from 
the equilibrium price and in a direction adverse to the hedgers and speculators. Since all 
trades occur at the bid or ask price of floor traders, the bid-ask spread gives the size of 
liquidity costs in the market. There are two types of bid ask spreads: quoted spreads and 
effective spreads. The quoted spread is the difference between floor traders bid and ask price. 
The effective spread is the difference between the price at which the floor trade buys (sells) 
a contract and the price at which he subsequently sells (buys) it (Smith and Whaley 1994). 
The present study mainly focuses on effective spreads since they represent the economic cost 
to producers of using the standardized exchange.  
Various estimators of effective bid ask spreads have been developed. Often bid-ask
quotes are not recorded and so bid-ask spreads must be estimated based on the available 
transaction data. Spread estimators developed in the literature have mostly used either the 
covariance of successive price changes or averages of absolute price chang s. The former 
type of estimator, originally applied in equity research, was first developed by Roll (1984). 
According to Roll (1984) if markets are informationally efficient and successiv  transactions 
are sale or purchase with equal probability, the covariance between price chang s is negative 
and directly related to the bid-ask spread. Chu, Ding, and Pyun (1996) proposed an extension 
of the Roll’s measure which relaxes the assumption of equal probability of trade di ection. 
Holden (2007) developed a model that uses both serial correlation like Roll’s measure and 
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price clustering to estimate the effective spread. The latter type of estimators employ absolute 
price changes, including average absolute price deviation proposed by Thompson and Waller 
(1987) and a different average absolute price deviation measure used by the Commodity 
Futures Trading Commission (CFTC). These two measures assume that the variability in 
price changes is exclusively due to liquidity costs. Thompson and Waller measure (TWM), 
as argued by Smith and Whaley (1994), contains real price changes along with bid ask 
spread. This measure was applied in Thompson and Waller (1988) to study the determinants 
of liquidity costs in coffee and cocoa futures markets, and was used to compare liquidity 
costs between two similar markets in Thompson et al. (1988). Ma et al. (1992) used the 
TWM to study intra-day patterns in spreads and the determinants of spreads for various
Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) contracts. In an attempt to filter out the real price changes 
in the TWM measure, CFTC uses only nonzero price changes that are in the opposite 
direction of the previous change. Smith and Whaley (1994) took a different approach to 
account for real price changes and proposed a method of moments estimator for effective 
spreads using first and second moments of absolute price change distribution. Recently, 
Frank and Garcia (2011) used a modified Bayesian approach proposed by Hasbrouck (2004) 
to estimate bid-ask spread in commodity futures markets and discussed its performance 
compared to other estimators.  
These measures require high frequency data. Roll’s measure can yield positive 
correlation when transactions are infrequent. Similarly, price changes used by the TWM and 
CFTC measures will be composed largely of changes in equilibrium priceswhen markets are 
thin. Generally, agricultural futures markets have enough observations for all the bove 
discussed measures to perform effectively. However, the options markets of agricultural 
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commodities are generally scarcely traded. Due to the small number of transactions per day 
in the options markets, the spread estimators do not estimate liquidity costs as efficiently as 
they do in the futures markets. Hence, a new measure of bid-ask spread is required which can 
effectively estimate the liquidity costs in thin markets. In the present study, we propose a 
new measure to estimate effective spreads in options markets. The new measure use  th  
futures option pricing formula proposed by Black (1975).    
In open outcry markets, similar to any other exchange traded asset, the price ofan 
option contract bounces between the bid and ask prices of the floor traders. Also, since all 
transactions occur at either bid or ask prices, the realized price is either hig or lower than 
the true price depending upon whether a transaction occurs at the ask price or bid price. 
Hence, on the average, absolute differences between the observed price and the true price of 
an option should be half of the bid ask spread. Black (1975) proposed a valuation model for 
options on futures that under the assumptions of no riskless arbitrage and a lognormal 
distribution, estimates the true price of an option. If a market is efficient and devoid of 
arbitrage opportunities any deviation of the observed price from the estimated true price 
captures half of bid-ask spread. We use the Black model to estimate the true equilibrium 
price of the option. Let 8 be the observed price of an option at time 4 and 89 be the 
estimated true price of the option using the Black formula then, on the average liquidity costs 
incurred by a trader for a round trip trade can be estimated as  
2 : ;<|8  89|=. 
 Unlike previously developed measures of bid-ask spreads, this measure does not require 
knowing the true price: it rather estimates the deviation around the true price. Hence, as long 
as the estimation error of the true price is less than half of bid-ask spread this measure 
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produces consistent estimates. Black (1975) defined the price of an option on futures as a 
function of five variables: strike price of the option, risk free interest rate, tim  to expiration 
of the option, underlying futures price, and volatility of the underlying futures price. The 
strike price, risk free interest rate, time to expiration and underlying futures price are directly 
observed. However, volatility of the underlying futures price is not observed directly. We use 
implied volatility from the Black model to estimate volatility of the underlying futures price. 
The estimation error of the implied volatility is one of the two sources of error in the 
proposed new measure. The other source of error comes from the staleness of the underlying 
futures price used in the Black model. Theoretically, the black model requires the underlying 
futures price at the same time the option price is realized but in practice the underlying 
futures price is generally not available at the same time of the option transacio . So we are 
forced to use the most recently transacted futures price. Hence, if the true equilibrium price 
of the underlying futures contract changes in the interim, the staleness of the futures price 
affects the estimate of the true option price and consequently affects th  proposed measure of 
liquidity cost. A technique to remove the effect of staleness in futures price and the 
estimation of the volatility of futures price is developed in this paper.  
Previous research examining liquidity costs in futures markets finds that liquidity 
costs decrease as trading volume increases, and increase as price variability increases 
(Thompson and Waller, 1988; Brorsen, 1989; Thompson, Eales, and Seibold, 1993; Bryant 
and Haigh, 2004; Frank and Garcia 2011). The volume effect implies the supply of liquidity 
services is downward sloping (Brorsen, 1989). Scalpers benefit from economies of size, and 
these benefits are passed on in the form of lower liquidity costs. Trading volumes for the 
same commodity in options markets are considerably lower than those in futures mark ts 
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(Figure 1). The options markets are also expected to be less liquid than the futures market
because the option market is segmented by puts, calls and varying strike prices in addition to 
date of maturity. Moreover, options contracts require higher skill for trading as it is more 
complex in terms of understanding and execution which more or less restrict thei use to 
specialized traders and firms. Liquidity costs in the options market are therefore expected to 
be higher than those in the underlying futures market.  
Data 
Kansas City Board of Trade employees overlook the trading pits from an area called “the 
pulpit.” As trading occurs, a “pit reporter” listens intently for prices shouted out by traders in 
the trading pit and relays them via a headset to a computer terminal operator known as the 
“data entry operator.” The operator enters the prices into a computer. These intraday prices 
for hard red winter wheat open outcry futures and option contracts are used in the present 
study. The dataset contains each trade price recorded for open outcry wheat futures and 
options contracts from January 2008 to December 2010. The underlying asset for options 
contracts are wheat futures contracts. At KCBT, wheat futures contracts a e traded with five 
expiration months: March, May, July, September, and December and options contracts expire 
every other month. However, only five options contracts, those with the same expiration 
months as futures contracts, are considered in the present study due to lack of volume in the 
other contracts. The KCBT does not record bid and ask price for open-outcry wheat futures 
markets but, for its open outcry wheat options market, it provides irregular time-sta ped bid 
and/or ask prices. Only the quotes observed at the same time are used to estimate observed
bid-ask spreads in wheat options markets. There is a possibility of selectivity bias in using 
the bid-ask quotes since bid-ask quotes are only reported when no trade occurs. If a trade is 
41 
less likely to happen given a wide bid-ask spread, bid-ask spreads would overestimate 
liquidity costs. The measures are computed for each day and then a weighted average is 
computed so that no changes across days are included. The descriptive statistics of he 
futures and option contracts are presented in Table 1. For the risk free rate of interest the 
interest rate on three month U.S. Treasury bills is used (USDT 2011). 
Procedures 
 Liquidity cost in options markets is estimated using bid-ask quotes and a new 
measure which uses trade price of options. Bid-ask spread is the difference betwe n ask price 
and bid price observed at the same time. Option liquidity cost can be measured as 
>?@A?B?4C DEF4  GFH  I?B. 
The second measure of option liquidity cost uses transaction data instead of the bid-ask 
quotes and is  
>?@A?B?4C DEF4  2 : ;<|8  89|= 
where, 8 is the observed option premium and 89 is expected premium obtained by Black’s 
formula. For call options, the expected option premium can be obtained as 
89  3
J·< · Φ
M  N · Φ
M/= 
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and for the put options it can be obtained as 
89  3
J·< · Φ










P9 · √4 
and 
 Φ
·  standard normal cumulative density function  
   price of underlying futures contract 
 N  option strike price 
 P9  predicted implied volatility (%)  
 4  time to expiration (days/365) 
 T  risk-free interest rate (%).   
All the parameters in the above model other than the volatility measure — the time to
maturity, the strike price, the risk-free rate, and the current underlying price — are 
observable. To estimate the volatility of the underlying futures, we use implied volatility 
calculated by inverting the above model and solving for P9 using Newton-Raphson method. 
Studies on implied volatility have shown that implied volatility can vary with moneyness of 
the option, time to maturity of the option and also the type of the option. At the money stock 
options generally predict lower implied volatility compared to deep out of the money options. 
Similarly, different maturities of the options also affect the predicted implied volatilities. We 
apply the following regression to filter out the effects of the above discussed factors and use 
the predicted volatilities from this model to estimate options prices. A different regression is 
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estimated for each option contract. To avoid negative predicted volatilities an expo ential 
relationship between the volatility and the factors was assumed:  
(1)    P  *+ , * , */U , ∑ *V0VWV& , 3  
where, P is implied volatility at time 4,  is moneyness of the option at time 4 which is 
difference between strike price and underlying futures price, 0V are fixed effects of trading 
day, U is a dummy variable for type of option which takes value of 1 if it is a call option or 0 
if it is a put option. An example estimate of the regression is presented in Table 2. Since the 
estimate of the volatility of the futures price depends on the above regression, the estimation 
error of the regression is a source of error in the measure of liquidity cost. As Table 1 shows, 
the standard error of this regression is small. 
The underlying futures prices used in the Black model were the most recent 
underlying futures price. Hence, the value of option premium is indirectly affected by 
staleness of the nearest underlying futures price and thus it affects the measure of liquidity 
cost. The effect of this staleness is removed by estimating the following regression: 
(2)     |8  89|  X0 , X1N4 , [4 
where N is length of time between the observed option transaction and the most recent 
underlying futures price. If staleness of the futures price is zero, 3\] represents the absolute 
difference between observed and predicted option premium. Thus, the liquidity costs can be 
calculated as two times the expected value of the above equation given St is zero: 
liquidity cost  2 : X0. 
Due to estimation error in the volatility, the estimates of liquidity costs from a new measure 
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are biased upward, but it does produce consistent estimates (sample size must increase for 
each day since adding days is not enough to achieve consistency). 
Liquidity costs in options markets estimated using the new measure are then 
compared with the liquidity costs in the futures market. Several different measures of spreads 
have been developed and applied to the futures markets. The properties and limitations of the 
measures are comprehensively studied in the literature. It has been argued that the different 
measures produce different estimates of liquidity costs for the same markt due to different 
underlying assumptions (Bryant and Haigh 2004; Frank and Garcia 2011). To make a 
comprehensive comparison of liquidity costs in options and futures markets we use eight 
different measures developed in the literature to estimate liquidity costs in the futures market.  
According to Roll (1983), if markets are informationally efficient, the covariance 




where, ∆ is change in price at time t. One assumption of Roll’s measure which is generally 
inappropriate for futures markets is that there is an equal probability of each transaction 
being buy or sale order (Bryant and Haigh 2004). Choi, Salandro, and Shastri (1988) 
proposed an extension of Roll’s measure which relaxes the assumption of equal probability 
of a transaction being a buy or sell order. They defined their measure as 
`NN  cov
∆, ∆1  a  
where a is the conditional probability that the next transaction type (bid or ask) is the same a  
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the current transaction type. If a  0.5 the ̀ NN measure reduces to Roll’s measure. If there is 
positive correlation in transaction type with a c 0.5 the estimates produced by Roll’s 
measure would be a downward biased estimates of the true bid ask spread (Choi, Salandro, 
and Shastri 1988). Chu, Ding and Pyun (1996) further extended Roll’s measure by using two-
period (transaction type at 4  1 and 4 , 1) conditional probability of the transaction type 




1  X  
where X is the conditional probability that the previous transaction type is the same as the 
current transaction type. When X  a the ̀ Ud measure reduces to `NN measure and when 
X  a  0.5 it reduces to the Roll’s measure. To estimate the probabilities X and a the 
transaction types are classified as bid or ask using the tick test suggested by Lee and Ready 
(1991).  
The measures discussed thus far use serial correlation of the price changes to estimate 
effective spreads in the market. Another measure of liquidity costs that uses absolute price 
changes is the Thompson and Waller (1998) measure, who suggested the average absolute 
value of price changes as a direct measure of the average execution cost. The Thompson and 
Waller measure is 




where, ∆F% are series of non-zero price changes. The Thompson and Waller measure assumes 
that the bid ask spread is the main determining factor of the price changes and ignores the 
true price changes. A similar measure used by Commodity Futures Trading Commission 
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(CFTC) attempts to eliminate the effect of true price changes by removing any price change 
followed by the same sign. Hence, it considers only non-zero opposite absolute price 
changes.  
Hasbrouck(2004) developed a Bayesian estimator of bid ask spreads based on Roll’s 
model: 
(3)                                                         i  j , D@ 
where j is the efficient price, i is observed transaction price, D is half bid ask spread and  
@    k,1 lET G IAC, 1 lET G F3>>m is the trade direction indicator so that the ask price is 
G   j ,  D, the bid price is I  j   D. The bid ask spread, the difference between G 
and I is 2D. It is assumed that j follows a random walk i.e. j  j , A where A is 
identically and independently normally distributed with mean 0 and variance 5n/. Taking the 
first differences in equation (3) we get the following regression model:  
(4)    Δi  DΔ@ , A  A~q
0, 5n/ 
where D, the half bid ask spread, is the estimated coefficient in the model. The regression in 
equation (4) is estimated using Bayesian methods. There are two parameters D and 5n/ and 0 
latent data values,@  k@, @/, … @hm in equation (4). The full posterior over parameters and 
latent data is summarized by the distribution function 
D, 5n/, @|i. Since the closed form 
representation of the distribution function does not exist, it is characterized by simulation, 
using Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) simulation and the Gibbs sampling method. As 
described in Hasbrouck (2004), the Gibbs sampler is an iterative procedure. Initially, the 
parameters and latent data are set to any values (subject only to feasibility). Denote these 
initial values kD<+=, 5n/<+=, @<+=m. The steps in the first sweep s  1 are: 
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1. Draw D<= from l
D|5n/<+=, @<+=, i 
2. Draw 5n/<= from l
5n/|D<=, @<+=, i 
3. Draw @<= from l
@|D<=, 5n<=, i 
The sample values of D, @ and 5n/ are drawn from their full conditional distribution based on 
observed transaction prices. That is, all parameters and latent data except for the component 
being drawn are taken as given. The next iteration starts with a draw of D</= conditional 
on 5n/<=, @<= and i. Repeating this n times, a sequence of draws kD<t=, 5n/<t=, @<t=m for s 
1 …  u are generated. The Gibbs principle ensures that after a sufficient number of samples, 
the sample distribution converges to 
D, 5n/, @|i. In the Hasbrouck measure (v-N), a 
truncated normal prior is used for c, producing a conditional distribution of c that is truncated 
and restricted to positive values, 
D|i~qwxyz{|}, Ωz{|} 
where, yz{|}  UB, Ωz{|}  5n/
Δ@Δ@, U  Δ@
5n/Δ@ , xΩz{JV|Jand B 
Δ@
5n/Δi , xΩz{JV|J , yz{JV|J. The positive normal distribution of D imposes non 
negativity restriction on bid ask spreads. In v-N measure the truncation of the distribution of 
D influences the mean and variance of the bid ask spread estimates. To circumvent this, Frank 
and Garcia (2011) modify the v-N measure by using a normal distribution as prior for D and 
imposing a non-negativity restriction on D by using absolute values of price changes and 
trade direction. The conditional distribution of D or Frank and Garcia measure (FGM) is  
D|i~qxyz{|}, Ωz{|} 
where, yz{|}  UB, Ωz{|}  5n/
|Δ@||Δ@|, U  |Δ@|
5n/|Δ@| , xΩz{JV|Jand 
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B  |Δ@|
5n/|Δi| , xΩz{JV|J , yz{JV|J. The conditional distributions of 5n/ and @ for 
both v-N and  measures are 
5n/|i~
X{|}, *{|} 
where, X{|}  X{JV|J , 4/2, *{|}  *{JV|J , ∑ A/ /2, with X{JV|J  *{JV|J  10/ and 
@{|}|i~3TuEA>>?xin 





  is probability that @  ,1. 
The priors for D, 5n/ and @ are yz{JV|J  0, Ωz{JV|J  10 and  @{JV|J~3TuEA>>?
1/2.We 
run 2000 swipes in Gibbs sampler to estimating the full posterior 
D, 5n/, @|i out of which 
first 400 (20%) are burned. We then calculate a sample mean of D and multiply it by two to 
get the estimate of bid ask spread. To test hypotheses about the factors influencing option 
liquidity costs, the following regression equation was estimated by maximum likelihood:  
 (5)                          C)  *+ , *) , */0) , *1U) , P) , 3) 
 where, C) is the new measure of liquidity cost for contract j at time 4, ) is moneyness 
of the option, 0) is time to maturity of contracts in days, U) is a dummy variable which 
takes the value 1 if it is a call option and 0 if it is a put option. The error terms P) and 3) 
are assumed independently distributed normal with mean zero and variances 5/ and 57/, 
respectively. 
Results 
The aggregate estimates of liquidity costs in KCBT wheat futures and options markets during 
the sample period of 2007-10 are presented in Table 3. The effective spread estimted using 
the new measure in the wheat options market is 4.33 cents per bushel. The average observed 
bid-ask spread is 4.30 cents per bushel. The bid-ask quotes are only reported when no trade 
49 
occurs. The effective spreads in futures market estimated using eight different measures 
ranged from 1.16 to 1.81 cents per bushels. The average Roll’s measure and Thompson and 
Waller measure for the wheat futures market are 1.37 cents per bushel and 1.58 cents per 
bushel, respectively. The result indicates that the option market has much higher liquidity 
costs. Thompson, Eales, and Seibold (1993) also estimated the same measures for selected 
1985 KCBT wheat futures contracts. Their estimates of average absolute deviations are 0.26–
0.29 cents per bushel for highly traded contracts, but are about double these values for lightly 
traded contracts such as the March contract during March or the September contract in 
February. Our measures are higher because the wheat markets were volatile and spreads were 
higher during the sample period. Regardless of which measures are used, the liquidity costs 
in the option markets are at least three times higher than liquidity costs in the futures market.  
Total volume traded in wheat futures contracts was considerably higher than volume 
in options contracts. Figure 1 shows monthly volumes in KCBT wheat open outcry futures 
and options contracts in 2008-10. Table 1 presents average daily volume and average volume 
per trade in the two markets. The daily volumes for the futures market are immensely higher 
than the daily volumes in the option market for all the contracts traded during 2008-10. 
Previous studies of liquidity costs in commodity markets have found a negative impactof 
volume on liquidity costs (Thompson and Waller 1987; Thompson, Eales, and Seibold 1993; 
Bryant and Haigh 2004 ; Shah and Brorsen 2011). Lower volumes in option markets can 
explain the higher liquidity costs in this market because lower volumes imply more risk of
holding contracts resulting in higher liquidity costs. Another explanation of higher liquidity 
costs in option markets can be higher volume per trade. For all the contracts in the sample 
period the average volume per trade in the option market was 28.76 contracts compared to 
50 
14.82 contracts for the futures market. As argued by Shah and Brorsen (2011), higher volum  
per trade indicates higher risk in holding the large contracts.  
To determine the relationship between liquidity costs in option contracts and 
moneyness of the option, time to maturity of the option, and the type of option, we estimated 
the model in equation (5) using restricted maximum likelihood. The new measure was used 
as the dependent variable in the model. The results are presented in Table 4. A significant 
positive impact of days to maturity of the option was found on the liquidity cost, which 
indicates higher risk of holding an option contract farther from maturity. However, there is 
no strong theoretical justification for the impact of maturity on liquidity costs. Previous 
studies of Brorsen (1989) and Anderson (1985) found no significant effect of maturity on 
liquidity costs in grain futures markets. A negligible negative impact of moneyness of the 
option was found on liquidity costs. Moneyness of the option is the difference between its 
strike price and the price of the underlying futures. Since, it is only a function of underlyi g 
futures price, moneyness is expected to have no impact on the liquidity cost of the option 
contract. The type of option had a significant impact on liquidity costs. The result indicates 
that the call options had greater liquidity costs than put options.   
Summary and Conclusion 
This study presents a new measure for estimating the effective bid-ask spread using time and 
sales data from option markets. Available measures of spreads in the literature are not 
effective for the option markets because these markets are very thin. A new measure is 
proposed which uses the Black option pricing model and implied volatilities along with 
option transaction prices. The study also estimates and compares liquidity costs in futures 
and options market simultaneously for the first time. Intraday prices of wheat futures and 
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options contracts traded on the Kansas City Board of Trade during 2008-10 are used. The 
liquidity cost in the wheat option market is 4.33 cents per bushel. The observed bid ask 
spread in the option market is 4.30 cents per bushel. The estimated liquidity costs in wheat 
futures market using eight different measures ranged from 1.16 cents per bushel to 1.81 cents 
per bushel. A positive relation was found between liquidity costs and days to expiration of 
the option. Moneyness of the options had negligible effect on liquidity cost of the option. 
Although, option contracts are often suggested as an alternative to futures contracts to avoid 
margin calls, it costs more to trade an option. The liquidity costs calculated her  assume a 
round turn in both futures and option markets. Note, however, that a producer using at-the-
money options and holding them to expiration would have one-half of the options liquidity 
cost and then would have half of the futures liquidity cost the half of the time that the option 
is exercised. Producers should consider that options have higher liquidity cost than futures.
Producers should also consider using limit orders rather than market orders when trading 
options as a possible way to reduce their higher liquidity costs. 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of Hard Red Winter Wheat Futures and Options 
Contracts Traded at KCBT in 2008-10  
Options Futures 
Contract 





















March 36 16.61 470.92 28.35 37 179.22 3208.78 17.90 
May 79 7.47 290.74 38.92 82 95.05 2001.04 21.05 
July 119 35.24 557.17 15.81 133 167.23 2208.54 13.21 
September 154 7.43 131.65 17.72 162 90.86 1163.20 12.80 
December 173 5.03 165.00 32.80 221 76.95 1162.40 15.11 
2009  
March 172 4.01 171.63 42.80 145 76.66 1016.15 13.26 
May 110 3.14 70.16 22.34 89 69.55 1011.51 14.54 
July 284 6.13 117.26 19.13 278 55.53 649.75 11.70 
September 147 4.14 97.46 23.54 96 75.85 922.37 12.16 
December 179 5.04 140.11 27.80 186 70.57 870.20 12.33 
2010  
March 157 3.31 155.74 47.05 137 54.15 881.65 16.28 
May 89 1.85 41.51 22.44 73 42.88 739.36 17.24 
July 244 3.67 49.45 13.47 139 44.75 651.86 14.57 
September 140 4.10 139.77 34.09 70 84.57 946.50 11.19 




Table 2. Estimated Parameters of Regression on the Implied Volatility 
Variable Estimate SE 
Intercept -1.9301 0.0373 
Moneyness (cents/bu.) 0.0005 < 0.0001 
Calls 0.0793 0.0021 
Standard Error of the Regression 0.0114 - 






Table 3. Measures of Liquidity Costs (cents/bu.) in Hard Red Winter Wheat Futures and Options Contracts from 2008-10. 
 Options Futures 
 BAS BASyz New Measure RM CSS CDP ABS TWM CFTC HAS FGM 
Liquidity 
costs 
3.59 4.30 4.33 1.37 1.81 1.44 1.24 1.58 1.38 1.16 1.66 
Standard 
error 
0.23 0.26 0.14 0.11 0.15 0.12 0.09 0.13 0.13 0.02 0.11 
Note: BAS = observed bid ask spread, BASyz = observed bid ask spread including pre-open quotes, RM = Roll’s measure, CSS = Choi, 
Salandro and Shastri measure, CDP = Chu, Ding and Pyun measure, ABS = Absolute price changes, TWM = Thompson and Waller measure, 
CFTC = Commodity Futures Trading Commission measure, HAS = Hasbrouck measure and FGM = Frank and Garcia measure. 
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Table 4. Estimated Parameters of Factors Affecting Liquidity Costs (cents/bu.) in 
Wheat Option Contracts at KCBT with New Measure as Dependent Variable 
Variable Estimate SE 
Intercept 2.7148 2.1649 
Moneyness (cents/bu.)  -0.0012 0.0007 
Days to expiration  0.0344 0.0018 




















Figure 1. Trading Volume of Open OutcryWheat Futures and Options 
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Appendix Table 1. Measures of Liquidity Costs (cents/bu.) in Hard Red Winter Wheat Futures and Options Contracts 
in 2008. 
Contract ABS ABSyz NM RM CSS CDP ABS TWM CFTC HAS FGM 














































































































Note: BAS = observed bid ask spread, BASyz = observed bid ask spread including pre-open quotes, RM = Roll’s measure, CSS = Choi, 
Salandro and Shastri measure, CDP = Chu, Ding and Pyun measure, ABS = Absolute price changes, TWM = Thompson and Waller 
measure, CFTC = Commodity Futures Trading Commission measure, HAS = Hasbrouck measure and FGM = Frank and Garcia measure. 
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Appendix Table 2. Measures of Liquidity Costs (cents/bu.) in Hard Red Winter Wheat Futures and Options Contracts in 
2009. 
Contract ABS ABSyz NM RM CSS CDP ABS TWM CFTC HAS FGM 














































































































Note: BAS = observed bid ask spread, BASyz = observed bid ask spread including pre-open quotes, RM = Roll’s measure, CSS = Choi, 
Salandro and Shastri measure, CDP = Chu, Ding and Pyun measure, ABS = Absolute price changes, TWM = Thompson and Waller measure, 






LIQUIDITY COSTS IN FUTURES AND OPTIONS MARKETS AT NATIONAL 
STOCK EXCHANGE, INDIA 
Abstract 
This study, for the first time, attempts to determine and compare liquidity costs in options 
and futures markets traded at the National Stock Exchange of India. Liquidity cost is one 
of several factors that traders should consider when choosing among the available trading 
instruments and exchanges. While considerable research has estimated liquidity costs of 
futures trading, there is little comparable research about options markets. The study also 
presents a new measure to estimate liquidity costs in options markets based on the Black-
Scholes model. The study uses transaction prices for futures and options contracts on 
S&P CNX Nifty index and high volume stocks traded at National Stock Exchange of 
India during 2007. The study uses Roll’s measure, two extensions of Roll’s measure, 
Thompson and Waller measure and two variants of Thompson and Waller measure to 
estimate liquidity costs in futures contracts. The same measures as well as the new 
measure are used to estimate liquidity costs in the options market. Liquidity costs in the 
futures markets were considerably higher compared to the option markets cross all the 
measures and assets considered in the study. A negative relationship is found between 
daily volume and liquidity costs. The price of the option has a positive impact on  
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liquidity costs. The put options had higher liquidity costs than the call options. The study 
concludes that liquidity costs in options markets are considerably higher than liquidity costs 
in futures markets. 
Introduction 
Transaction costs are an important decision variable for an investor to choose among 
available trading instruments and exchanges. On any standardized exchange the main 
components of transaction costs are brokerage fees, taxes and liquidity costs. Unlike 
brokerage commissions and taxes which are explicit, liquidity costs are hidden. The difficulty 
with which an asset is traded can either be measured in time – how long it takes to trade – o  
in price – the price concession it takes to trade immediately (Stoll 2000). Liquidity costs are 
the price concession. Buyer initiated trades are usually made at the ask price and seller 
initiated trades at the bid price. Thus the difference between the bid price and the sk price is 
a measure of liquidity cost. For instance, a trader who desires to sell an asset quickly would 
rather receive the available bid price than run the risk of submitting a limit order that is not 
executed. Similarly, an eager buyer would pay a price concession and accept the available 
ask price so that his order is absorbed by the market immediately. Therefore, a trader who 
desires to immediately sell or buy an asset will suffer a markdown on his realized price in the 
adverse direction. Such price effects are negatively associated with market liquidity. Traders 
in liquid markets trade with little price effect to their transactions while in thin markets, the 
transactions of individual traders may have significant price effects and may therefore result 
in substantial liquidity costs.  
Liquidity costs can affect the profitability of any trade, portfolio or managed fund. 
With an increase in use of derivative markets for risk management, futures and options 
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contracts have become important tools for traders to hedge their risk. Investors often need to 
choose between futures and options markets to trade and investors will prefer lower liquidity 
costs. Increasing use of futures and option contracts suggests a potentially large audience for 
a study of liquidity costs with these derivatives.  
In this paper, liquidity costs are estimated for futures and options contracts traded on 
listed stocks at National Stock Exchange (NSE), India. NSE of India is a completely order 
driven electronic market trading futures and options contracts on indexes and securitie . With 
substantial growth in the Indian economy and technological advancements, stock and 
derivative markets in India have attracted investors globally. There are several studies related 
to microstructure in emerging futures and options markets. However, microstructure of the 
derivative markets in India has not been analyzed. Chakrabarty and Jain (2005) studied 
market microstructure of NSE and estimated liquidity costs in stocks listed on NSE. 
However, no studies were found that investigate liquidity costs in futures and options 
markets in India. Increasing interest of global investors in emerging derivative markets of 
India and lack of research on these markets motivates the present study. This study estimates 
and compares liquidity costs in futures and options contracts traded on ten high-volume 
stocks and the major index listed on NSE. Liquidity costs are estimated using two variants of 
average absolute price deviations and Roll’s measure. A new measure is introduced to 
estimate liquidity costs in options. The study identifies the impact of different factors such as 
daily volume, volume per trade, price volatility and type of options on liquidity costs. A the 
liquidity costs directly affect the returns of a portfolio the results of this study are intended to 
help hedgers and speculators choose between futures and option contracts. Knowledge of 
liquidity costs can help investors to compare and evaluate available exchanges. Moreover, 
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Knowing liquidity costs can help researchers in accounting for them while simulating 
hedging strategies or speculative trading. The results will also aid regulators and exchange 
management in increasing fairness and efficiency of the market.  
Trading environment at NSE, data and sample selection 
The NSE is mutually-owned by a set of leading financial institutions, banks, insurance 
companies and other financial intermediaries in India. It is a completely autom ted limit 
order market. Price formation in this exchange occurs on its electronic online trading 
platform known as NEAT (National Exchange for Automated Trading). It adopts the 
principle of an order driven market in much the same way as Electronic Communication 
Networks (ECN) operates in the United States. NSE is the first exchange in the world to use 
satellite communication technology for trading. Its client-server-based trading platform 
NEAT operates on 2,888 Very Small Aperture Terminals (VSATs) in 365 cities sprad all 
over the country. The exchange currently provides trading in 4 different segments viz., 
Wholesale Debt Market segment, Capital Market segment, Futures and Options segment and 
the Currency Derivatives Segment. The Futures and Options segment, which is the focus 
here, supports an anonymous order driven market, which operates on a strict price/time 
priority. At any point of time there are only three contract months available for trading, with 
1 month, 2 months, and 3 months to expiry. These contracts expire on the last Thursday of 
the expiry month. If the last Thursday is a trading holiday, the contracts expire on the 
previous trading day. A new contract is introduced on the next trading day following the 
expiry of the near month contract. All derivatives contracts at NSE are pres ntly cash settled.  
NSE keeps a comprehensive dataset for all the derivative securities traded in th  
exchange. For each day of trading the dataset contains three types of data: Trade data, Bhav-
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copy, and snapshot data. The trade data file contains real time information on all trades that 
take place in each futures and options contract for that day. The Bhav-copy file rovides 
summary information about each security for each trading day including open, close, high, 
low, settlement prices and daily volume. The snapshots file contains bid ask quotes, which 
are snapshots of the limit order book at given hours of the day. Unlike the TAQ data, the 
NSE provides quotes data at various points in time, and not continuously throughout the day. 
NSE takes a snapshot of the limit order book at five different times of a trading day viz. 11
a.m., 12 p.m., 13 p.m., 14 p.m. and 15 p.m. The snapshot data contains all outstanding orders 
at a particular time of the day. It indicates whether the order is to buy or to sell, its volume 
and the time at which the order was entered in the system. 
Our data set contain the aforementioned three files for each trading day for all futures 
and options contracts traded at NSE in 2007. Futures and options contracts were traded on 
237 stocks and 4 indexes in 2007. While the futures contracts were intensively traded for all 
the stocks at NSE, the options contracts, especially the put options were thinly traded for 
most stocks. Futures contracts contributed 90.7 percent of the total trades in the futures and 
options segment of NSE. Since one of the main objectives of the present study is comparing 
liquidity costs in the futures and the options markets, having sufficient observations in both 
the futures and the options contract of a stock is important. To ensure sufficient observations 
in both futures and options contracts of a stock and to make results presentable, one major 
index and 10 heavily traded stocks are selected for study. The trading activity in the sample 
index and stocks is presented in Table 1. The sample covers 39.14 percent of trades in the 
futures and option segment of NSE.  
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Methods 
In an order driven electronic market, limit orders supply liquidity while market orders 
demand liquidity. Orders are matched according to the price and time they are entered i  the 
system. Any market order that enters the system is matched with the best available bid or ask 
price depending on whether it is a sell order or a buy order. Hence, at any point of time the 
spread between the best ask price and the best bid price represents liquidity in the market. 
Any trader who uses a market order incurs a cost equal to the difference betwe n available 
bid and ask price on a round turn trade. There are two types of bid ask spreads: quoted 
spreads and effective spreads. The quoted spread is the difference between floor traders bid 
and ask prices. The effective spread is the difference between the price at which he floor 
trader buys (sells) a contract and the price at which he subsequently sells (buys) it (Smith and 
Whaley 1994). If bid and ask prices are recorded, liquidity costs can be directly cal ulated by 
taking the difference. However, exchanges do not always record observed bid and ask prices. 
The NSE provides snapshots of the limit order book at five different points in time but not 
continuously throughout the day. We use snapshot data to estimate observed bid ask spreads 
and evaluate the indirect measures of bid ask spreads developed in the literature. Various 
indirect measures of spreads have been developed that use commonly available transaction 
prices.  Spread estimators developed in the literature have mostly used the covarian e of 
successive price changes or have employed averages of absolute price changes. The former 
type of estimator, originally applied in equity research, was first developed by Roll (1984). 
According to Roll (1984) if markets are informationally efficient and successiv  transaction 
are sale or purchase with equal probability, the covariance between price chang s is negative 
and directly related to the bid-ask spread. Roll’s measure (RM) has been effectively used in 
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equity markets and is 
  2cov
∆d, ∆d 
where, ∆d is change in the transaction price of a contract at time t. The main drawback of 
Roll’s measure is that when there is a positive covariance in successive price changes the 
formula evaluates to a non real number and the observations for that day need to be 
discarded. One assumption of Roll’s measure which is generally inappropriate fo  futures 
markets is that there is an equal probability of each transaction being a buy or sell order 
(Bryant and Haigh 2004). Choi, Salandro, and Shastri (1988) proposed an extension of Roll’s 
measure which relaxes the assumption of equal probability of a transaction being a uy or 
sell order. They defined their measure as 
`NN  cov
∆, ∆1  a  
where a is the conditional probability that the next transaction type (bid or ask) is the same a  
the current transaction type. If a  0.5 the ̀ NN measure reduces to Roll’s measure. If there is 
positive correlation in transaction type with a c 0.5 the estimates produced by Roll’s 
measure would be a downward biased estimates of the true bid ask spread (Choi, Salandro, 
and Shastri 1988). Chu, Ding and Pyun (1996) further extended Roll’s measure by using two-
period conditional probability of the transaction type being bid or ask. Chu, Ding and Pyun 




1  X  
where X is the conditional probability that the previous transaction type is the same as the 
current transaction type. When X  a the ̀ Ud measure reduces to `NN measure and when 
X  a  0.5 it reduces to the Roll’s measure. To estimate the probabilities X and a the 
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transaction types are classified as bid or ask using the tick test suggested by Lee and Ready 
(1991). The other type of measures used in this study uses average absolute price changes to 
estimate liquidity costs. Thompson and Waller (1988) suggested the average absolute value 
of price changes as a direct measure of the average liquidity cost of trading. The Thompson 
and Waller measure (TWM) is 




where, ∆d is a series of non-zero price changes. This measure, as argued by Smith and 
Whaley (1994), contains equilibrium price changes along with bid ask spread. This measure 
was applied in Thompson and Waller (1988) to study the determinants of liquidity costs in 
feed grain futures markets, and was used to compare liquidity costs between two similar 
markets in Thompson et al. (1988). Ma et al. (1992) used the TWM to study intra-day 
patterns in spreads and the determinants of spreads for various Chicago Board of Trade
(CBOT) contracts. In an attempt to filter out the real price changes in TWM measure, 
Commodity Futures Trade Commission (CFTC) uses only nonzero price changes that are in 
the opposite direction of the previous change.  
There are several other variations of above discussed measures of liquidity costs 
proposed in the literature. Hasbrouck (2004) estimated Roll’s measure using a Bayesian 
approach in pit traded futures on Chicago Mercantile Exchange. Smith and Whaley (1994) 
suggest a method to estimate effective bid-ask spread from transaction data in futures 
markets that uses first and second moments of absolute price changes. The focus of these two 
studies was open outcry futures markets where market makers play an important role in 
providing liquidity. Since Roll’s measure and average absolute price change measure h ve 
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been widely used in equity futures markets and since we are interested in relative
performance of these measures in futures and options markets at the NSE, we use Roll’s 
measure, TWM measure, and variants of the two measures to estimate liquidity costs in 
futures markets.  
The indirect measures of liquidity costs discussed above are extensively used in stock 
futures markets (Hasbrouck 2004; Locke and Venkatesh 1997; Laux and Senchack 1992; 
Roll 1984). However, the indirect measures have not been used to estimate liquidity costs of
stock options. Due to the lower volume in options markets, the indirect estimators likely do 
not estimate liquidity costs as accurately as they do in futures markets. Since, the NSE does 
not provide continuous observed quote data and we have selected heavily traded stock 
options we apply the indirect measures of liquidity costs to the stock options in the present
study. Further, we propose a new measure of liquidity cost in options markets which uses 
Black-Scholes formula for pricing option on stocks.  
On standardized exchanges, the transaction price of an asset bounces between the bid 
and ask prices prevailing in the market. Also, since all transactions occur at either bid or ask 
prices, the realized price is either higher or lower than the true price depending upon whether 
the transaction occurs at the ask price or the bid price. Hence, on the average, absolute 
differences between the observed price and the true price of an option should be half of the 
bid ask spread. Black and Scholes (1973) proposed a valuation model for stock options that 
under the assumptions of no riskless arbitrage and a lognormal distribution, estimat  the true 
price of an option. If a market is efficient and devoid of arbitrage opportunities any deviation 
of the observed price from the estimated true price captures half of bid-ask spread. We use 
the Black-Scholes model to estimate the true equilibrium price of the option. Let 8 b  the 
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observed price of an option at time 4 and 89 be the predicted true price of the option using 
Black and Scholes formula then, the liquidity costs incurred by a trader for a round trip trade 
can be estimated as 
>?@A?B?4C DEF4  2 : ;<|8  89|=. 
89 is calculated using the Black-Scholes formula for options. We use a modification of the 
Black-Scholes model proposed by Hull (2003) to use futures prices instead of using price of 
the underlying asset. According to Hull (2003), when the market is devoid of arbitrage 
opportunities and the risk free rate of interest is constant, for an asset providing a continuous 
dividend yield over the life of futures contract, the futures price of the asset can be given as 
+  N+3
J, 
where, N+ is current spot price of the asset, T is risk free rate, @ is dividend yield over the life 
of the futures contract and 4 is time to maturity of the futures contract. Our sample consists of 
the most frequently traded futures and options contract at the NSE (see Table 1). Th refore, 
the assumption of no riskless arbitrage opportunity in the selected futures marketis 
reasonable and the equality in the above equation is likely to hold. If the maturities are the
same for both futures and options contracts on the same underlying instrument, which is true 
for any futures and options contract at the NSE, Hull (2003) derived the following 
modification of the Merton model that uses futures price of the underlying asset in tead of 
spot price. For call options the true price can be estimated as 
89  3
J·<+ · Φ
B   · Φ
B/= 
and for put option, it is 
89  3
J·<+ · Φ







P9 · √4, 
B/  B  P9 · √4, 
+ is futures price of the underlying asset,  is strike price of the option, T is risk free interest 
rate, 4 is time to expiration and P9 is volatility of the underlying asset. The above mentioned 
model represents option price as a function of five quantities: strike price, risk free interest 
rate, time to maturity, volatility of the underlying index and the index future pric. Since we 
estimate 89 using this option pricing model in our proposed measure of liquidity cost, the 
measure is also a function of these five variables and is affected by variations n them. The 
first three variables: strike price, risk free interest rate and time to maturity are directly 
observed. For the present study, strike price and time to maturity are taken from the available 
dataset for each options contract. The Mumbai Inter-Bank Offer Rate (MIBOR) is used for 
risk free interest rate. However, the volatility of the underlying index is not directly observed. 
To estimate the volatility of the underlying futures contracts, we use implied volatility 
calculated by inverting the above model and solving for P9 using the Newton-Raphson 
method. Studies on implied volatility have shown that variables such as moneyness of the 
option, time to maturity of the option and also the type of the option affects the predicted 
implied volatility. At the money stock options generally predict lower implied volatility 
compared to deep out of the money options. Similarly, different maturities of the options also 
affect the predicted implied volatilities. We apply the following regression to filter out the 
effects of the above discussed factors and use the predicted volatilities from this model to 
estimate options price.  
(1)                                        P  *+ , * , */U , ∑ *V0VWV& , 3 
where, P is implied volatility at time 4,  is moneyness of the option at time 4 which is 
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difference between strike price and underlying futures price, 0V are fixed effects of trading 
day, U is a dummy variable for type of option which takes a value of 1 if it is a call option or 
0 if it is a put option. Since the estimate of the volatility of the futures pricedep nds on the 
above regression, the estimation error of the regression is a source of error in the measure of 
liquidity cost. 
Another source of error for the measure of liquidity cost is the use of the most recent 
futures price. The Black-Scholes model requires the use of price of the futures realized at 
exactly the same time the option price is realized. The futures price is generally not available 
at the same time of the option transaction and we are forced to use the most recent futures 
price. Hence, if the true equilibrium price of the underlying contract changed i the nterim, 
the staleness of the futures price could affect the accuracy of the estimat of true option price 
and consequently affect the proposed measure of liquidity cost. The effect of this staleness is 
removed by estimating the following regression: 
(2)                                          |8  89|  X0 , X1N4 , [4 
where N is length of time between the observed option transaction and the most recent 
futures price in seconds and [ is independently normally distributed with mean 0 and 
variance σ/. Since, the expected value of staleness is zero, 3\] represents the absolute 
difference between observed and predicted option premium. Thus, as defined earlier the 
liquidity costs can be calculated as two times the expected value of the above equation given 
St is zero: 
liquidity cost  2 : X0 
The use of estimated implied volatility and recent futures prices are the two sources of errors 
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in the proposed measure which might overestimate the true liquidity costs. The present study 
also uses the snapshot data provided by the NSE to estimate observed bid ask spreads. To 
obtain actual spreads, one needs the bid and ask quotes which can be obtained from the limit 
order book. The NSE, at this time, does not distribute continuous limit order book data. 
However, the NSE collects snapshots of the limit order book at five different times of the 
trading day. The actual spreads were measured as 
    >?@A?B?4C DEF4  GFH  I?B  
where, GFH and I?B are price of sell order and buy order respectively of a specific contract 
observed in a snapshot recorded at time t. Generally, there are more than one outstanding buy 
or sell orders when the snapshot is taken. The highest buy order price was taken as I?B and
lowest sell order price was taken as GFH. The snapshot data records four types of orders: At 
the Opening (ATO), stop orders, market orders and limit orders. We drop the ATO, stop 
orders and market orders from the dataset since the ATO orders are priced based on pre open 
prices and the stop orders are not active until a specific price is hit during the trading. We 
observed several buy and sell limit orders with extremely high or low prices. G nerally, such 
extreme observations are dropped out since only the best bid and the best ask prices are 
considered to calculate observed bid ask spread. However, when there are only few bid and 
ask prices observed, such extreme observations distort the estimate of bid ask spread. To 
overcome this problem we only include those contracts where at least 10 bid and ask prices 
are observed.  
A number of variables related to the microstructure of the market have been found to 
affect liquidity costs. Previous research on futures markets found that liquidity costs and 
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trading volume are negatively correlated (Thompson, Eales and Seibold 1993). High volume
reduces risk from holding inventory. Also, higher volume means more likely a non-market 
maker will enter a limit order. The price of a security is known to have an effect on the 
spreads in the market (Stoll 2000; Chakrabarty and Jain 2005). To test hypotheses about 
factors influencing liquidity costs, the following regression equation was estimated by 
maximum likelihood:  
(3)                                C)  *+ , */d) , *1.) , *U) , P) , 3) 
 where, C) is average absolute price deviations for day 4 nd contract j, d) is average 
price of the day, .) is daily volume, Dt is a dummy variable which takes the value 1 if it is a 
call option and 0 if it is a put option, P) is random effect of contract j. The error terms P) 
and 3 are assumed independently distributed normal with mean zero and variances 5/ and 
57/, respectively. 
Results 
Descriptive statistics of the futures and the option contracts on selected stocks and an index 
are presented in Table 1. The futures contracts are extensively traded compared to the options 
contracts for all the assets in the sample. Also, the number of trades in call options is 
considerably higher than with put options. The estimated measures of liquidity costs for 
futures and options contracts on S&P CNX Nifty index and the average of ten selected stoks 
are presented in Table 2. The estimates of individual stocks are presented in Appendix I. The 
average liquidity costs in S&P CNX Nifty futures were INR 0.76 to INR 1.92. The same 
measures for S&P CNX Nifty call options ranged from INR4.63 to INR 7.79 and for put 
options they were INR 2.50 to INR 4.83.Thus bid-ask spreads were considerably higher in 
the options markets, regardless of measure. Similar results were found for the individual 
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stock futures and options contracts considered. However, the difference between the liquidity 
costs in futures markets was less for individual stocks than for the index. The observed 
spreads, estimated using snapshot data, also follow the same pattern of higher spreads in the 
options market than the futures market. The observed spreads in both markets are higher than 
estimated spreads using the indirect measures. The reason behind higher observ d spr ad 
might be due to the fact that the snapshot data are only reported five times in a tradig day12. 
If a trade is less likely to happen given a wide bid-ask spread, the observed bid-ask spreads 
would overestimate effective spread in the market. The estimated spreads in the option 
markets using the new measure are also presented in Table 2. The new measure is used to 
estimate spreads in the options market. The estimates of the new measure more closely 
follows the other estimates of spreads in call options compared to the put options. This i 
because the new measure, in a way, represents the weighted average of the spreads in call 
and put options combined and in the sample the call options are more frequently traded 
compared to the put options (Table 1). Moreover, an option with each strike price is 
considered as a separate asset when these measures are estimated which resulted in loss of 
data when options on some strike prices were infrequently traded. Since the put options were 
thinly traded compared to the call options, the loss of data in put options was higher reducing 
the consistency of the estimates for the put options. The new measure may be more accurat
than the other measures since it includes all trades rather than only including tra es when the 
market was active. The result indicates that regardless of which measures re used the 
liquidity costs in option markets are considerably higher than in futures markets. The result 
agrees with the results of Shah, Brorsen and Anderson (2009) who compared liquidity costs 
                                                          
12
 We only considered those contracts for which at least 10 bid and 10 ask prices were observed at the time of 
snapshot. When estimated without applying this rule the observed spreads were estimated about 10-15 times 
higher. 
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in wheat futures and options markets. They found that the liquidity costs in options markets 
were at least three times higher than in the futures markets.  
Total volume and volume per trade are presented in Table 3. The total volumes for 
the futures market are immensely higher than the volumes in the option market for all he 
assets traded during 2007. To determine the relationship between liquidity costs in ption 
contract, daily volume of the option contracts, price of the option and the type of option, we 
estimated the model in equation (3) using restricted maximum likelihood. Average absolute 
price deviations were used as the dependent variable in the model. The results are present d 
in Table 4. A significant negative impact of daily volume was found on liquidity costs. 
Previous studies of liquidity costs in futures markets have found a negative impact of volume 
on liquidity costs (Thompson and Waller 1987; Thompson, Eales, and Seibold 1993; Stoll 
2000; Bryant and Haigh 2004 ; Shah and Brorsen 2011). Lower volumes in option markets 
can explain the higher liquidity costs in this market because lower volumes imply more risk 
of holding contracts resulting in higher liquidity costs. The price of the option had a
significant positive impact on liquidity costs. Chakrabarty and Jain (2005) found the same 
relationship between stock price and liquidity costs in the capital market segment of the NSE. 
The result also indicates that liquidity costs in call options were lower compared to the put 
options which can be explained by the lower volumes in the put options.   
Summary and Conclusion 
 This study estimates and compares liquidity costs in the futures and options contracts traded 
on National Stock Exchange of India. A new measure is proposed which uses the Black-
Scholes option pricing model and implied volatilities along with option transaction prices. 
We also estimate liquidity costs using Roll’s measure, Thompson and Waller measure, and 
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four variants of these two measures. Regardless of the measure used, liquidity costs in the 
options markets are considerably higher compared to the futures markets. Significant 
negative relationships are found between liquidity costs and daily volume of the asset and 
liquidity costs and price of the asset. Liquidity costs in put options are higher compared to 
the call options. Liquidity cost is one of the important decision variables for a trader’s choice 
of trading instrument as well as trading exchange. This study provides results that have broad 
implications to different market participants such as investors, firms, regulators and exchange 
management in achieving their goals of highest returns and lowest costs. Futures op ions 
have a lower delta than futures contracts and futures options have a lower price. On a 
percentage basis, liquidity cost in options is even higher than that in futures. One approach 
that market participants may want to use is to use futures when an immediate trade is desired 
through a market order, but to consider options when limit orders are used.
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Table 1. Number of Trades in Futures and Options Contracts of Selected Index and Stocks Traded at National Stock 
Exchange, India, 2007. 










S&P NIFTY 26,567,351 106,696 4,673,218 18,768 4,852,828 19,489 36,093,397 
RELIANCE 5,382,182 21,615 770,773 3,095 219,522 882 6,372,477 
RCOM 4,765,812 19,140 271,268 1,089 38,539 155 5,075,619 
SBIN 3,651,332 14,664 262,322 1,054 96,999 390 4,010,653 
RPL 3,207,235 12,880 362,027 1,454 68,618 276 3,637,880 
TATASTEEL 3,188,444 12,805 326,475 1,311 102,059 410 3,616,978 
IDBI 2,783,776 11,180 316,478 1,271 56,757 228 3,157,011 
INFOSYSTCH 2,601,182 10,447 270,582 1,087 60,345 242 2,932,109 
RNRL 2,399,163 9,635 204,670 822 35,976 144 2,639,809 
SAIL 2,232,704 8,967 199,461 801 44,464 179 2,476,629 
IFCI 1,620,298 6,507 184,963 743 31,642 127 1,836,903 
Selected stocks 58,399,479 234,536 7,842,237 31,495 5,607,749 22,521 71,849,465 
% of total trades in 
sample 
35.08 - 70.89 - 93.24 - 39.14 




Table 2. Measures of Liquidity Costs (INR) in Selected Stock Futures and Options 
Markets Traded at the NSE, India in 2007. 
OBS ABS TWM CFTC RM CSS CDP NM 
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Note: OBS = observed bid ask spread, ABS = Absolute price changes, TWM = Thompson and Waller 
measure, CFTC = Commodity Futures Trading Commission measure, RM = Roll’s measure, CSS = 
Choi, Salandro and Shastri measure, CDP = Chu, Ding and Pyun measure, NM = New measure 
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Table 3. Trading Volumes in Futures and Options Contracts of Selected Index and Stocks Traded at National Stock 
Exchange, India in 2007. 














S&P CNXNifty 7553.92 226.70 1300.43 412.36 1459.31 471.96 
RELIANCE 2027.22 317.40 209.08 322.71 55.05 261.79 
TATASTEEL 4198.99 850.50 204.30 755.37 28.39 737.81 
SBIN 1528.94 406.17 88.87 408.05 30.76 526.68 
RPL 12697.59 3917.45 1299.11 3573.45 249.04 3676.77 
INFOSYSTCH 2901.82 850.55 257.49 802.18 77.18 773.76 
IDBI 8592.47 3128.15 880.88 2909.03 155.27 2908.87 
SAIL 466.66 168.17 44.28 186.40 10.12 195.89 
RCOM 19997.58 7905.57 1523.83 7369.36 270.00 7504.91 
RNRL 6918.69 3028.59 567.56 2874.17 130.03 2887.90 
IFCI 19491.91 13288.25 1863.56 12182.06 324.66 12253.01 
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Table 4. Estimated Parameters of Factors Affecting Liquidity Costs (INR) with Average 
Absolute Price Deviation as a Dependent Variable in Selected Stock Futures and 
Options Markets Traded at the NSE, India in 2007.  
Variable Estimate SE 
Intercept 0.5457 0.0548 
Price (INR)  0.0303 0.0007 
Daily volume  -0.00003 < 0.0001 
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Appendix Table 1. Measures of Liquidity Costs (INR) in Selected Stock Futures and 
Options Markets Traded at the NSE, India in 2007. 
OBS ABS TWM CFTC RM CSS CDP NM 
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Note: OBS = observed bid ask spread, ABS = Absolute price changes, TWM = Thompson and Waller 
measure, CFTC = Commodity Futures Trading Commission measure, RM = Roll’s measure, CSS = 
Choi, Salandro and Shastri measure, CDP = Chu, Ding and Pyun measure, NM = New measure  
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Appendix Table 2. Measures of Liquidity Costs (INR) in Selected Stock Futures and 
Options Markets Traded at the NSE, India in 2007. 
OBS ABS TWM CFTC RM CSS CDP NM 
 





















































































































































































































































Note: OBS = observed bid ask spread, ABS = Absolute price changes, TWM = Thompson and Waller 
measure, CFTC = Commodity Futures Trading Commission measure, RM = Roll’s measure, CSS = 
Choi, Salandro and Shastri measure, CDP = Chu, Ding and Pyun measure, NM = New measure  
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market at KCBT using intraday transaction prices. Factors such as daily volume, 
volume per trade, volatility and price clustering are used to explain the difference 
in liquidity costs in the two markets. The second essay attempts to guide the 
choice problem that agricultural producers face when selecting between futures 
and options markets to hedge their cash market position. Liquidity costs in KCBT 
wheat options and futures market are estimated and a new measure of liquidity 
costs in options markets is proposed. The third essay deals with the liquidity costs 
of stock and stock index futures and option markets at National Stock Exchange 
(NSE) of India. The liquidity costs are estimated using the new measure as well  
several other measures previously developed in the literature.  
Findings and Conclusions: The main findings of the first essay are that the electronic 
wheat futures market has lower liquidity costs for all but the largest traders t 
KCBT. The key to continued existence of the open outcry market appears to be its 
ability to handle large orders. The second essay concludes that although, option 
contracts are often suggested to agricultural producers as an alternative to futures 
contracts to avoid margin calls, it costs more to trade an option. Regardless of the 
measure used, the liquidity costs in options markets were at least three times 
higher compared to the futures markets. A similar difference is found between the 
liquidity costs in stock and stock index futures and option markets at NSE, India 
in the third essay. The difference is more prominent in stock index futures and 
options compared to the individual stock futures and options. 
